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BANISHMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
FAIR REPRESENTATION SUITS:
PUNISHING THE WRONG PARTY?-
IBEW v. FOUST
Since the Supreme Court first articulated a union's duty of fair repre-
sentation in 1944, 1 courts have struggled to define not only the nature and
extent of that duty 2 but also the appropriate remedies in the case of a
1. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). Both cases were brought under the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 691, §§ 1-8, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1976)), and involved claims of racial discrimination brought by black railroad
employees who had been systematically excluded from the union due to their race. In Steele,
the Court held that as long as a union assumes to act as the exclusive bargaining representative
of a craft or class of employees,
the language of the Act . . . , read in the light of the purposes of the Act, expresses
the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative ... the duty to
exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts,
without hostile discrimination against them.
323 U.S. at 202-03.
Tunstall addressed the further question of whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to
entertain a non-diversity suit brought under the Railway Labor Act. The Court determined that
the case would be one arising under a law regulating commerce and therefore would be within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 323 U.S. at 213. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-47
(1957) (reaffirmed the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases brought under the Railway
Labor Act as well as the duty of unions to represent all unit members fairly and impartially).
2. The leading case on the nature of a breach of the duty of fair representation is Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), in which the Court stated that "[a] breach of the statutory duty of
fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bar-
gaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. Although the Court
acknowledged that an employee does not have an absolute right to have his or her grievance
taken to arbitration, the Court warned that arbitrarily ignoring a grievance or processing it
perfunctorily would qualify as a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 191.
Other courts have readily adopted the Vaca standard, while recognizing that it resists precise
formulation. See, e.g., Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 182-83 (4th Cir. 1972) (breach of duty by
union for filing grievance with person antagonistic to employee's interests); Retana v. Apartment
Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 1972) (breach of duty by union for failure to
adequately represent Spanish-speaking employees); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores
Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 283-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (breach of duty
by union for arbitrary failure to press grievances based on violation of seniority provision in
collective bargaining agreement). Determination of whether a breach has occurred depends on
the facts of each case. Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d at 182; Trotter v. Motor Coach Employees,
309 F.2d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 1962). In Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971), the Supreme Court attempted further to refine the standard, characterizing a breach as
conduct that includes "evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to
legitimate union objectives." id. at 301. The distinction has also been made between "honest,
mistaken conduct ... and deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment." Id. In the
Sixth Circuit, fraud, dishonesty of purpose, misrepresentation, or such gross mistake as to imply
bad faith constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. Bundy v. Penn Central Co., 455
F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1972) (withdrawal of meritless grievance not necessarily evidence of
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breach.3 In the absence of specific statutory directives, the propriety of
punitive damages in fair representation suits has been the object of consider-
able dispute among the federal courts. 4 Not only has the appropriate stan-
dard to be followed been the subject of disagreement, 5 but the fundamental
propriety of punitive damages in fair representation suits has been ques-
tioned. 6 Recently, in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Foust, 7 the United States Supreme Court settled the question of punitive
damages in fair representation suits brought under the Railway Labor Act 8
by eliminating such damages as an appropriate remedy. Stating that punitive
awards conflicted with "remedial" federal labor policies, the Court deter-
mined that the threat punitive damages posed to union financial stability and
bargaining strength far outweighed any possible advantages of such a rem-
edy. 9 Consequently, even particularly outrageous union misconduct will
no longer merit a punitive sanction.
This Note analyzes the Court's treatment of underlying precedent and its
balancing of policy considerations in Foust. In addition, it is demonstrated
that the concurring opinion 10 reflects a more realistic attitude toward the
competing interests of the individual and his or her union and the need for a
punitive sanction in limited instances. Finally, Foust's impact on labor-
management relations is evaluated.
union's bad faith); Balowski v. UAW Local 735, 372 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1967) (improper
motive or deliberate discrimination necessary to prove breach of duty by union that withdrew
employee's grievance).
Despite such attempts to clarify the Vaca standard, disagreement exists as to what kind of
activity falls within the standard. It is generally agreed, however, that negligence or an error of
judgment are insufficient to constitute a breach. Dwyer v. Climatrol Indus., 544 F.2d 307, 311
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977) (union's approval of plant closedown agree-
ment not evidence of breach of duty because even exercise of poor judgment is insufficient to
constitute a breach); Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir.
1975) (union's failure to raise defense that sobriety rule on which employee's discharge was
based was improperly promulgated-possibly negligent handling, but insufficient to constitute
breach); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1975) (union's agreement to represent
employee and subsequent failure to do so, without notification to employee that charge had
been dropped, was more than negligence and constituted a breach); Bazarte v. United Transp.
Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970) (union's decision to drop grievance in face of compel-
ling evidence against employee not negligent or bad faith conduct). See Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1975) (union's failure to discover falsity of company charges
against employees involved more than error of judgment).
3. See notes 38-39, infra, for a discussion of the disagreement among the circuit courts as
to the type of union misconduct justifying punitive awards.
4. See notes 38-39 infra.
5. See note 38 infra.
6. See notes 39 & 46 infra.
7. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
8. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
9. 442 U.S. at 49-52.
10. Id. at 52-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Leroy Foust, a radioman employed by the Union Pacific Railroad and a
member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW),
was injured while at work in March, 1970. 11 Foust received a medical
leave of absence after his injury, which he sought to renew shortly before it
was to expire. 12 Although the Union Pacific had not received a required
medical statement supporting Foust's request for an extension, the Railroad
assured Foust in writing on January 25, 1971, that review of his request
would be delayed until the document arrived. Despite this assurance, Foust
was discharged on February 3, 1971, for failing properly to request an exten-
sion. 13
When the Railroad refused to reconsider its decision, Foust's attorney
wrote to the IBEW District Chairman and requested that grievance proceed-
ings be instituted pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 14 Although the sixty-day deadline was imminent, union officials de-
layed the filing of the action until after the deadline had expired. 15 The
Railroad denied the claim due to tardiness and, on appeal, the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board upheld the company's decision. 16
Foust sued the union and several of its officers in the District Court for
Wyoming, alleging that the IBEW's failure to file a timely grievance consti-
tuted unfair representation under the Railway Labor Act. The jury awarded
Foust $40,000 actual damages and $75,000 punitive damages. 17 The Court
11. Foust filed two claims against the railroad that were settled in 1973. Brought under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the first claim for work-related personal injuries was set-
tled by a $75,000 payment to Foust, less $2,600 he had received in sickness benefits. Foust's
second claim arose as a result of the termination of his employment by the Railroad, but he
released his claim and waived future right of employment upon receipt of the $75,000 settle-
ment. Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1978).
12. Id. This was in accordance with rule 23(b) of the collective bargaining agreement, which
provides: "Failure to report for duty at the expiration of leave of absence shall terminate an
employee's service and seniority, unless he presents a reasonable excuse for such failure not
later than seven days after expiration of the leave of absence." Id.
13. 442 U.S. at 43-44.
14. Id. Rule 21(a)(1) of the collective bargaining agreement provides: "All claims or griev-
ances must be presented in writing by or on behalf of the employee involved, to the officer of
the Carrier authorized to receive same, within 60 days from the date of the occurrence on
which the claim or grievance is based." Id. 'at 44 n.2.
15. D.F. Jones, the District Chairman, received the attorney's letter fifty-two days after
Foust's dismissal. Although the sixty-day deadline was imminent, Jones contacted the IBEW
Chairman, Leo Wisniski, instead of instituting grievance proceedings. Wisniski then drafted a
letter insisting that Foust submit a written request to the union to handle his claim. Wisniski's
letter was sent to Jones, who then forwarded it to Foust. Foust received this letter sixty-one
days after his discharge. Jones, however, proceeded to file Foust's claim before receiving
Foust's written authorization. Wisniski prepared the claim form in Omaha and forwarded it to
Jones in Rawlins, Wyo. Jones then mailed the claim to the Union Pacific Railroad in Omaha.
This roundabout procedure resulted in the filing of Foust's claim two days after the expiration of
the deadline. Id. at 44.
16. Id.
17. Foust v. IBEW, No. C 74-50B (D. Wyo., May 17, 1976).
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit" affirmed the judgment except as to the
amount of punitive damages. 19 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari2 0 and reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that
punitive damages were impermissible per se in unfair representation suits
brought under the Railway Labor Act. 21
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The duty of fair representation is a judicially evolved doctrine that pro-
tects individual employees from union abuses in the negotiation and ad-
ministration of collective bargaining agreements. 22 Once a union assumes
to act as the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft or class of
employees, it becomes their agent and must represent the interests of all
such employees fairly and impartially. 23 The union's obligation, however,
does not preclude it from entering into collective bargaining agreements that
may be unfavorable to some members of the represented group. 24 So long
as a union's actions are based on relevant, permissible factors, 2 5 excluding
18. Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978).
19. Id. at 719. The court first determined that an award of punitive damages was justified on
the facts of the case. The standard utilized by the Tenth Cireuit to reach that conclusion was the
Fourth Circuit's "wanton and reckless disregard" test: "Wanton conduct or reckless disregard for
the employee should suffice." Id. The court specifically rejected the third circuit's suggestion
that punitive damages are perhaps impermissible in unfair representation suits, as well as the
Eighth Circuit's express malice requirement. Id.
While the court concluded that the IBEW's reckless disregard justified a punitive damages
award, it expressed some uncertainty as to the proper amount. Although the jury's award of
$75,000 in punitive damages appeared high to the court, it did not seem excessive. The court
declined to rule on the point and instead remanded the case for reconsideration of the awarded
amount, stating that the trial judge could better evaluate the matter as he had heard the evi-
dence and would be more familiar with the facts. Id.
20. 439 U.S. 892 (1978). The majority specifically limited its grant of certiorari to the ques-
tion of punitive damages, noting that the findings of the courts below as to the union's actual
breach of the duty of fair representation and the propriety of the compensatory damage award
would be taken as correct. 442 U.S. at 45 n.4.
21. Id. at 52. justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, White, and Powell joined.
22. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (duty includes processing of grievances and
administration of an existing agreement); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952) (duty
exists at negotiation stage). For an excellent overview of the development of the duty of fair
representation, see Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C.L. REV. 813 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Fanning].
23. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). In addition, the union's
obligation includes the fair representation of the interests of non-union members. International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. at
200; Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
24. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 349-50; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. at
203.
25. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 350; Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957
(5th Cir. 1976).
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any elements of personal animosity or discrimination, 26 a union will not ex-
pose itself to liability for a breach of the duty of fair representation.
While a wide range of reasonableness is allowed a union in the exercise of
its powers, its authority is necessarily limited. 27 A union is bound to avoid
the arbitrary, hostile, or discriminatory treatment of those employees it rep-
resents, and its conduct is subject to the test of good faith. 28 Decisions
regarding the merit of grievances must be made in a similarly non-arbitrary
fashion, 29 although a union is not required to exhaust every available proce-
dure upon demand by an employee. 30
Once a breach by the union has been established, an appropriate remedy
must be granted. Injunctions, damages, 31 and an order compelling arbitra-
tion 32 have been held permissible remedies. The damages assessed against a
union may not include damages attributable solely to the employer's breach
of contract. 33 A union is therefore liable, according to the apportionment
principle of Vaca v. Sipes, only for any increases in those damages directly
caused by its refusal to process a grievance. 34 While it is generally agreed
26. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 350.
27. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. at 342; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
28. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 335 (1964). Fed-
eral law is to be applied in determining whether a breach of the duty of fair representation has
occurred. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298 (1971); Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. at 343-44; Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). For
a detailed discussion of the elements constituting a breach of the duty of fair representation, see
note 2 supra.
29. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191.
30. St. Clair v. Local 515, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969).
31. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. at 207 (injunctions and damages held permis-
sible remedies).
32. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 184.
33. id. at 197.
34. Id. at 197-98. The Court defined its principle as follows:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the employer and
the union according to the damage caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages
attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the
union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to pro-
cess the grievance should not be charged to the employer.
Id.
This sensible policy has been followed by numerous courts: Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970) (union and company pay portion of damages according to individual fault in wrongful
discharge case); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) (union and
company both contributed to employee's injuries in discharge case, so each must bear half of
total damages); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 958 (1976) (union directly chargeable with damages for its own deliberately misleading
conduct causing employee's loss of right to bring claim); Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
480 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1973) (union not chargeable with damages because no proof it engaged
in racially discriminatory practice); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425
F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (company chargeable with entire amount
of damages where union's conduct did not increase or contribute to improper discharges).
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that compensatory damages may be assessed against a union for its breach of
the duty of fair representation, 3 5 the availability of punitive damages has
been the object of judicial disagreement. Further, if the particular labor
statute under which a case is brought is ambiguous or silent as to the proper
remedy, the matter of relief becomes more complicated. 36 In such in-
35. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (compensatory damages available under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), though not awarded on
particular facts of case); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (compensatory
damages available under § 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976)); Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (compensatory damages available under Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976)); International Bhd. of Boilernmakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) (compensatory damages available under § 101(a) of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)
(1976)). See R. GORMAN, LABon LAw 722 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORNMAN].
36. The Railway Labor Act is silent on the question of remedies. Therefore, the duty of fair
representation is necessarily inferred from the spirit and purpose of the entire Railway Labor
Act. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. at 204.
Remedial provisions in other labor statutes have led to differing interpretations by the courts.
For example, the Taft-Hartley Act, which covers unlawful union activities and conduct, provides
that recovery for an unfair labor practice shall be "the damages by him sustained." Labor Man-
agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). Although such language is
ambiguous, it has been interpreted as limited to compensatory damages. Local 20, Teamsters v.
Morton, 377 U.S. at 260-61. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which covers suits by and
against unions, contains no provision regarding appropriate damages. Although the availability of
punitive damages under § 301 has been the subject of judicial disagreement, the recent trend
supports the use of punitive awards in limited instances. See list of cases and discussion in
Butler v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 747, 752-53 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd in part
and remanded in part sub nora. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
The relevant provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-
Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976), which was enacted to provide for the disclosure of
certain financial transactions and administrative practices of labor organizations, furnish a further
analogy. Section 101 of the Act contains a bill of rights for union members, while § 102 pro-
vides that a violation of the rights of a union member under the Act will justify "such relief
(including injunctions) as may be appropriate." The latter open-ended provision has also caused
judicial dispute as to whether punitive damages are an appropriate remedy under § 102. The
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits agree that punitive damages are an
appropriate remedy under § 102. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.
1976) (punitive damages available upon showing of malice or wanton indifference, though § 102
judgment reversed due to jury instruction violation); Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of
Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976) (punitive damage award probably justified by
malice or reckless indifference to rights of union member in case of retaliatory job assignment,
though case reversed and remanded due to inadequate record); International Bhd. of Boiler-
makers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) (punitive dam-
ages properly awarded for malicious action in case of unlawful expulsion from union). Other
lower courts, however, have refused to allow punitive damages. Magelssen v. Local 518, Plas-
terers & Cement Masons, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (punitive damages not recovera-
ble in § 102 suit for employee's expulsion from union); Keenan v. District Council of Carpenters
& Jointers, 59 LRRM 2510 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (punitive damages not recoverable in § 102 suit for
employee's removal from office and suspension by union); Burris v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (punitive damages not recoverable in § 102 suit
for expulsion from union and blacklisting).
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stances, courts have attempted to fashion remedies to effectuate the pur-
poses of the specific legislation. 37 The unsettled state of labor law regarding
the propriety of punitive damages in unfair representation cases therefore
prompted the Court, in IBEW v. Foust, to resolve the issue in the context
of Railway Labor Act suits.
THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS
Pre-Foust lower court decisions revealed disagreement as to the type of
union misconduct justifying a punitive damage award in unfair representa-
tion suits. Standards such as wantonness and reckless disregard, willful or
arbitrary abuse, and actual malice had been approved by the various circuit
courts. 38 Although no circuit court of appeals had totally barred punitive
37. A passage from Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), has been widely
quoted by various courts faced with the lack of specific congressional directives as to remedies:
"Some [problems] will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy
of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial
inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." Id. at 457. See also Elgin, J. &
E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 729 (1944).
Commenting upon appropriate remedies under the Railway Labor Act, the Court, in Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., resolved that the Act "contemplates resort to the usual judicial remedies of
injunction and award of damages when appropriate for breach of that duty." 323 U.S. at 207.
Professor Cox contends that when sections of a statute contain ambiguities, emphasis should be
placed on the underlying rationale of the statute rather than on a close construction of the
statutory language. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 852 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
38. The Fourth Circuit has determined that wanton misconduct or reckless or callous disre-
gard for the rights of another, without any proof of actual malice or personal animosity, is
sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d
558, 563-64 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). Proof of malice is required in the
Eighth Circuit. See Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1977)
(punitive damages unjustified in absence of showing that union acted maliciously in agreeing
that it would not insist employer hire from union hall); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (punitive damages inap-
propriate because union displayed no malice in favoring one group of employees over another in
merger of two companies). Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971), required a finding of actual damage before punitive damages could
be awarded. Willful abuse has been mentioned by the Second Circuit as the requisite element
for an award of punitive damages. Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 292-93 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
The handling of the remedies question in cases brought under the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976), is instructive by
way of analogy. The element required for an award of punitive damages under § 102 is the
reckless or wanton indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. See note 36 supra. In Morrissey v.
National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976), a § 102 case, the Second Circuit com-
mented that "[i]f punitive damages can be awarded against other defendants, they can be
awarded against unions as well." Id. at 25. In addition, punitive damages may be awarded even
where only nominal compensatory damages have been awarded. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908, Comment c (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; Reynolds v. Pegler, 223
F.2d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
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damages as an available remedy in unfair representation cases, the Supreme
Court held that such awards were impermissible. 39 The Foust majority, in
fact, shifted its attention from the conflicting standards of the circuit courts
to the overall propriety of punitive damages under the Railway Labor
Act. 40 Because the Act is silent as to appropriate remedies for a breach of
the duty of fair representation, 4 1 the Court undertook to implement a reme-
dial scheme consistent with the Act's conciliatory objective of industrial
peace. 42  It concluded that punitive damages would be violative of the con-
ciliatory purposes of the Railway Labor Act, viewing such damages solely in
the aspect of an undeserved punishment on the union.4 3
39. Although the Third Circuit had suggested that punitive damages were impermissible, the
Third Circuit case that the Court found persuasive did not totally bar punitive damages as a
possible remedy. In Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977), the court declined to decide whether punitive damages might be
appropriate in certain instances. Instead, it merely held that punitive damages would not be
allowed where no actual damages were shown. Id. at 1019. In Local 127, United Shoe Workers
v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962) (per curiam), however, the Third Circuit
indicated that punitive damages were inappropriate under remedial labor statutes.
Two Ninth Circuit cases in which punitive damages were denied are similarly distinguishable.
In Dente v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots Local 90, 492 F.2d 10 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974), a damage award was rejected because there was
evidence only of union negligence and not the kind of "arbitrary abuse" required for an award
of damages. Id. at 12. In Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970), the
court denied a punitive damage award because of the nature of the grievance alleged (conspir-
acy of personal defendants who were officers and executive officials of the defendant union).
Nowhere was it claimed that punitive damages were otherwise totally unavailable as a possible
remedy in unfair representation suits.
40. 442 U.S. at 47-48.
41. See Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). In fact, the duty of fair representa-
tion itself is judicially implied from the statute. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
204 (1944).
42. 442 U.S. at 47. The conciliatory purposes of the Railway Labor Act are set out in 45
U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976), which refers to the "prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements." See Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758-61 (1961), and Virginian Ry. v. Railway
Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 542-48 (1937), for brief discussions of the conciliatory purposes of the
Railway Labor Act.
The remedial, conciliatory character of the Railway Labor Act is undisputed. See Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railway Employees, 93 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1937): "The statute is in purpose,
mechanism and effect, in the highest sense remedial." Id. at 342. The comments of Representa-
tive Denison during the debate over the Railway Labor Act are in agreement: "It is not a penal
statute. It is remedial." 67 CONG. REC. 4652 (1926).
The propriety of judicial fashioning of remedies in the absence of specific statutory provisions
is addressed in note 37 supra.
43. 442 U.S. at 48-51. The general availability of punitive damages in tort actions for the
purposes of deterrence and/or punishment is not questioned, RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at
§ 908(1). Their proper use and effectiveness, however, is debated. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 219-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]; W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 11 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
These authorities recognize the necessary presence of particularly aggravated misconduct to
justify punitive damage awards, emphasizing that the defendant's mental state is the crucial
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The Court offered several arguments in support of its conclusion. First,
the majority found it significant that no express provision for punitive dam-
ages or extraordinary sanctions had been included by Congress in the Rail-
way Labor Act. This prompted the majority to conclude that such remedies
were excluded from the purview of the Act. 4 4  Second, the Court looked to
the principle that a union and employer apportion damages in amounts at-
tributable to each party's fault. 45 Citing this principle as authority for the
proposition that union liability should be severely restricted, the Court ar-
gued that windfall recoveries in the form of punitive damages could have the
undesirable effect of depleting union treasuries and causing serious erosion
of a union's broad discretion in handling subsequent grievances. 46 The
factor in determining the propriety of the award. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at § 908(2);
DOBBS, supra, at 204-05; PROSSER, supra, at 9-11. The standards by which to judge an allegedly
culpable frame of mind are abstract and therefore provide room for difference of opinion. Typi-
cally, such characteristics as maliciousness, recklessness, wanton misconduct, fraudulent or evil
motives, and deliberate disregard for the interests of others are suggested as mental states
justifying punitive damage awards. DOBBS, supra, at 205-06; PROSSER, Supra, at 9-10. Gross
negligence and innocent mistake do not qualify as the sort of conduct calling for punitive dam-
age. PROSSER, supra, at 10.
Punitive damages are awarded apart from any compensatory or nominal damages. They are
not, however, given as a matter of right. While such an award generally is made to punish the
defendant and to deter others from pursuing similar conduct, the availability of punitive dam-
ages may encourage plaintiffs to sue in order to be reimbursed for elements of damage not
otherwise legally compensable. PROSSER, supra, at 9-11; DOBBS, supra, at 204-05.
Several courts have determined that a breach of the duty of fair representation is in the
nature of a tort. Bond v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5, 9 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975);
De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 285-87 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292, 298
(M.D.N.C. 1970); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 968, 969 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
In addition, the elements used to prove a breach of the duty (arbitrariness, discrimination, and
bad faith) are highly suggestive of the characteristics used to justify awards of punitive damages
in tort suits. Compare note 2 supra with PROSSER, supra, at 9-10 and DOBBS, supra, at 205.
44. 442 U.S. at 52. While the Court assumed the power to fashion a remedy in the absence
of an explicit congressional directive, the lack of a provision for damages is not necessarily
indicative of an intent to exclude damages. Note, Punitive Damages Under Section 102 of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 529, 530 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Section 102 Punitive Damages]. See United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 665 (1954) (absence of a statutory provision in the Taft-Hartley Act
regarding the consequences of tortious conduct already committed does not necessarily indicate
that existing criminal penalties or liabilities have been eliminated); Butler v. Yellow Freight
System, 374 F. Supp. 747, 753 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (silence of an act as to proper remedies
actually lends support to argument that punitive damages are permissible), aff'd in part and
remanded in part sub nom. Butler v. Local 823, int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
45. 442 U.S. at 49-50. See note 33 supra for a more detailed discussion of the apportion-
ment principle set forth in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 197-98.
46. 442 U.S. at 49-51. The windfall recovery argument has also been offered in the con-
text of punitive damages in tort actions. Viewed as compensation beyond a plaintiff's due, puni-
tive damages are criticized as invitations to capricious, prejudiced juries to make outlandishly
large awards, imposed without criminal safeguards such as the right to invoke the fifth amend-
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Court further reasoned that the entire collective bargaining system might be
disrupted if unions were compelled to process all grievances, no matter how
frivolous. 47 Therefore, according to the majority, any deterrent effect that
punitive damages might have upon future union misconduct would be out-
weighed by the risk to employees if their union's collective bargaining
strength were impaired through discretionary encroachments or financial as-
sessments. 48
THE CONCURRING OPINION: APPROPRIATE CRITICISM
Justice Blackmun, who concurred only in the result of the Foust deci-
sion, 49 highlighted the salient points of the majority opinion by presenting a
step-by-step response to its reasoning. He agreed that, because the IBEW's
conduct toward Foust amounted to little more than negligence, punitive
damages were inappropriate on the facts of the case.5° He therefore con-
tended that the majority easily could have held that the trial judge erred as
a matter of law in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury.51
Because an unnecessarily sweeping rule was announced instead, Justice
Blackmun took issue with the majority, criticizing not only their rule but
their reasons.
Misapplication of Precedent
Justice Blackmun first noted that the majority had misapplied Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad52 and Vaca v. Sipes 3 as authority for its
contention that punitive damages are an impermissible remedy in Railway
Labor Act suits. 54 As he observed, however, neither case expressly prohib-
ited punitive awards. For example, he noted that in Steele the Court had
approved "resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of
damages when appropriate." 55 Although such language is seemingly suggestive
ment. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 219-20; PROSSER, supra note 43, at 11. On the other hand,
persuasive arguments in support of punitive damages may be advanced. For example, they
provide an incentive to sue in order to obtain redress from a continuing pattern of behavior,
even if on a petty level. Further, an award that will help defray the costs of litigation is not
necessarily an undeserved windfall, and judicial supervision and approval of the jury's award is
available. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 220.
47. 442 U.S. at 51.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 61. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined in the
concurrence.
50. Id. at 60-61. Foust himself contributed to the late filing of his grievance because he
waited to notify the union until fifty-two days of the sixty-day period had passed. Id. at 60.
51. Id. at 61.
52. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
53. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
54. 442 U.S. at 53-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55. 323 U.S. at 207.
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of a wide range of remedies, the Foust majority chose to view it in a narrow,
restrictive sense, emphasizing the implications of the word "usual." 56  Focus-
ing on the "unusual" aspect of punitive damage awards, the majority justified
their exclusion by concluding that such awards were not within the scope of
the Steele court's supposed approval of only "usual" remedies. 57 As Justice
Blackmun observed, however, the majority apparently ignored the language
in Steele that discussed the crucial importance of providing, in the absence
of an administrative remedy, a judicial remedy for victims of unfair rep-
resentation. 58 Therefore, Justice Blackmun inferred that if any emphasis is
to be placed on a specific word from the Steele opinion, it should be on the
word "judicial" rather than "usual." 59
Justice Blackmun also criticized the majority's narrow interpretation of the
dictates of Vaca v. Sipes. Vaca involved a union's refusal to process an
employee's grievance through the fifth and final step of the grievance proce-
dure after an unfavorable medical report convinced the union that the griev-
ance undoubtedly would be unsuccessful. 60  The Vaca court did reverse a
jury's award of punitive damages, but only because punitive damages would
have been unjustified on the particular facts of the case. 61 Not only did the
union fail to act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, 62 but most or all
of the employee's damages were attributable to the employer, not to the
union. 63 Vaca was cited by the majority as authority for its position that
union liability should be reduced whenever possible to avoid imposing a
"real hardship" on a union. 64 However, the "real hardship" that the Vaca
court determined to avoid was the union's payment of the employer's share
56. 442 U.S. at 49. As Justice Blackmun commented: "The Court's italics may make its
point clear, but they do not make its argument correct, and they provide no substitute for a
fairminded appraisal of what Steele says." Id. at 55 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 49 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 55 (Blackmun, J., concurring). As Justice Blackmun noted, the pertinent lan-
guage in Steele regarding remedies is actually expansive. Id. According to the Steele court:
In the absence of any available administrative remedy, the right here asserted, to
a remedy for breach of the statutory duty of the bargaining representative to repre-
sent and act for the members of the craft, is of judicial cognizance. That right would
be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the remedy which courts can give for
breach of such a duty or obligation and which it is their duty to give in cases in
which they have jurisdiction. . . . For the present command there is no mode of
enforcement other than resort to the courts, whose jurisdiction and duty to afford a
remedy for a breach of statutory duty are left unaffected.
323 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted).
59. 442 U.S. at 55 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
60. 386 U.S. at 175, 175 n.3, 176.
61. Id. at 193, 195-96.
62. Id. at 193-94.
63. Id. at 195-98.
64. 442 U.S. at 50.
1979] 249
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
of damages, not the payment of damages itself. 65 Justice Blackmun there-
fore expressed skepticism at the majority's interpretation of Vaca as a broad
or general prohibition of punitive awards in unfair representation cases, 66
especially because the Court itself emphasized in Vaca that appropriate re-
medial schemes would vary with the facts of each case. 67
Furthermore, the Foust majority utilized the compensation principle ar-
ticulated in Vaca as authority for the position that while a damage award
should make an employee "whole," it should do no more. 68 As Justice
Blackmun contended, however, a closer reading of both Vaca and Steele
reveals that an employee's remedies must include damages to compensate
him or her fully. 69 Neither case stands for the principle that damages
should be excluded if they rise above the level of actual compensation. 70
Justice Blackmun therefore criticized the majority for transforming Vaca's
"liberal 'compensation principle' into a parsimonious limiting rule," and for
"convert[ing] the floor beneath the injured employee's remedies into a ceil-
ing on top of them." 71 Clearly, Justice Blackmun was unconvinced as to the
accuracy and wisdom of the majority's narrow interpretations of Vaca and
Steele's expansive remedial suggestions.
65. 386 U.S. at 197 (1967):
Though the union has violated a statutory duty in failing to press the grievance, it is
the employer's unrelated breach of contract which triggered the controversy and
which caused this portion of the employee's damages. . . . It could be a real hard-
ship on the union to pay these damages. . . . [W]e see no merit in requiring the
union to pay the employer's share of the damages.
Id.
66. 442 U.S. at 55-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
67. 386 U.S. at 195. As Justice Blackmun noted, Steele and Vaca agree that the "full
panoply of tools traditionally used by courts to do justice between the parties" is available in
unfair representation cases, with the. specific remedy applied according to the circumstances of
the particular breach. 442 U.S. at 53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He further commented that
punitive damages therefore would be "presumptively available" unless Congress specifically di-
rected otherwise. id.
68. Id. at 49 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Vaca court, fearing that an arbitrator might
lack the authority to award damages against the union, held that a "court should be free to
decide the contractual claim and to award the employee appropriate damages or equitable re-
lief." 386 U.S. at 196. Steele's approval of the "usual judicial remedies of injunction and award
of damages" in the absence of an administrative remedy similarly indicates that judicial damages
are appropriate relief for an injured employee. 323 U.S. at 207.
70. 442 U.S. at 54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Arguably, if a union is not chargeable with
compensatory damages, punitive damages would be inappropriate, but that is a very different
proposition from the viewpoint advanced by the majority. In any event, the Court expressed no
disapproval of the jury's award of compensatory damages in Foust. Id. at 45 n.4 (majority opin-
ion).
71. Id. at 54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The Implications of "Remedial" Labor Statutes
A second flaw in the majority's reasoning noted by Justice Blackmun was
the contention that because federal labor policy is "essentially remedial,"
punitive damages would be an inappropriate remedy. 72 He reasoned that
labelling federal acts as "remedial" does not necessarily mean that they are
inhospitable to punitive damages. 73 Rather, the propriety of punitive
awards depends upon the specific provisions of the particular statute. 74 Al-
though the Railway Labor Act is silent on the matter of authorized remedies,
the majority nevertheless cited two previous Supreme Court decisions, both
clearly based on express statutory language from other labor acts, as author-
ity for its position that punitive damages are an impermissible remedy under
remedial labor statutes.
Justice Blackmun contended that both cases cited by the Court were in-
apposite to a discussion of remedies appropriate under a statute lacking in
specific remedial directives. 75 In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 76 the
Court held that the NLRB is powerless to order punitive sanctions. The
decision, however, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, 77 was strictly confined
to the statutory competence of the Board as authorized by the National
Labor Relations Act. 7 8 Therefore, the Justice contended that Republic Steel
is not pertinent to the question of judicial approval of punitive awards be-
cause the federal courts have both the authority and the jurisdiction to im-
pose punitive sanctions. 79 In Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 80 the reversal
72. Id. at 52 (majority opinion).
73. Id. at 55-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 311 U.S. 7 (1940). The Board had ordered the reinstatement with back pay of employees
who had been discharged in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 8. However,
the employer was further ordered to deduct from back pay the money the employees received
for work performed for government agencies while they were on work relief projects. Id. The
Court determined that the NLRB lacked the statutory authority to order the employer to pay
the deducted amounts to the government agencies. Id. at 9, 12.
77. 442 U.S. at 55-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
78. 311 U.S. at 10-12. As the Court noted: "We do not think that Congress intended to vest
in the Board a virtually unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures, and thus to prescribe
penalties or fines which the Board may think would effectuate the policies of the [National
Labor Relations] Act." Id. at 11. The Board's lack of punitive powers was reiterated in Local
60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961), another case cited
by the majority. 442 U.S. at 52. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958); NLRB v.
United States Steel Corp., 278 F.2d 896, 900 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961).
79. 442 U.S. at 56.
80. 377 U.S. 252 (1964). Morton concerned an action brought under § 303 of the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). During a strike, the union
had encouraged customers and suppliers of the employer to cease dealing with the employer.
377 U.S. at 253. There was no violence. Id. at 260. The Court interpreted the language of the
Act, with references to its legislative history, as excluding punitive damages in instances that
involve only peaceful secondary activities. Id. Compensatory damages, however, were allowed.
Id. at 256.
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of a punitive damage award was based upon a close reading of the statutory
language of section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act"' in con-
junction with pertinent passages from the Act's legislative history. 82 The
language of the statute and its legislative history clearly limit recovery to
actual, compensatory damages. 83 Noting that Congress had expressed no
similar restriction on damages in fair representation suits, Justice Blackmun
asserted that Morton therefore was clearly inapposite. 84 He concluded that
neither Republic Steel nor Morton supported the Court's argument that
punitive damages are impermissible under "remedial" labor statutes. 85
Effect on Union Treasuries and Discretionary Power
The Foust majority acknowledged that punitive damages serve both as a
useful incentive for bringing unfair representation suits and as a means of
encouraging union willingness to pursue employee grievances. 86 The Court
determined, however, that such advantages were outweighed by the possi-
bility that union financial stability and discretion in processing grievances
might be severely impaired by punitive damage awards. 87
Although the majority concluded that compensatory damages alone would
be sufficient to remedy a breach of the fair representation duty, 8 Justice
Blackmun disagreed. He observed that a union's liability for such damages is
frequently de minimis because the bulk of damages is generally assessed
against the employer. 89 Therefore, compensatory damages would have little
impact on a union, and union treasuries would "emerge unscathed."90
81. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). Section
303 of the Act provides for recovery of "the damages by him sustained." Id.
82. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 260 n.16. The comments of Senator Taft
clearly indicate that recovery was intended to be limited to actual damages. 93 CONG. REC.
4872-73 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft). He referred to restoration of lost money and subsequently
commented that § 303 "simply provide[s] for the amount of actual damages." Id. at 4858, 4872-
73.
83. See Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 260, 260 n.16.
84. 442 U.S. at 56 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 48 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 48-52.
88. Id. at 48-50.
89. Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d
558, 563 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976) (union's liability for compensatory
damages in fair representation suit usually de minimis, so employee requires stronger legal
remedy); Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 981-82 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973) (union's liability for failure to process an employee's grievance
usually de minimis); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 491
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (union's liability for failure to timely assert an
employee's grievance generally limited to compensatory damages); St. Clair v. Local 515, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969) (union's liability for damages de minimis
for merely failing to take all available steps to remedy employee's grievance). The point is also
illustrated in Vaca v. Sipes, where the Court recognized that all or most of the employee's
damages were attributable to his allegedly wrongful discharge by the company. 386 U.S. at 198.
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Justice Blackmun also found unpersuasive the Court's warning that the
constant threat of punitive damages could curtail a union's exercise of discre-
tion in handling grievances. 91 The majority contended that broad union
supervision over employee complaints not only encourages settlements but
also permits the refusal to process frivolous grievances. 92 According to the
Court, if punitive damages were allowed for mishandling claims, unions
might feel compelled to process all grievances, no matter how frivolous, with
the ultimate result that employer confidence in the union would be eroded
and union decision-making disrupted. 93 Justice Blackmun responded to the
Court's assertion by commenting that some "chilling of union 'discretion' " in
instances of notorious union misconduct is not an undesirable goal, 94 as in-
jurious conduct should not be permitted to continue unchecked. While he
directed less of his criticism at the matter of union discretion, implicit in
Justice Blackmun's concurrence is the conviction that union interests are
being protected and promoted at the expense of the individual employee
who has been injured by his or her union's misconduct. The concurrence did
not advocate the awarding of punitive damages in all instances of union mis-
conduct, but compellingly argued that the remedy should be available to
protect an employee in limited instances of particularly egregious union mis-
behavior. 9'
IMPACT OF THE FOUST DECISION
By prohibiting punitive damages as an available remedy in fair representa-
tion suits, the Court has effectively immunized unions from liability for their
actions. Compensatory damages rarely inflict much hardship on a union be-
Therefore, a union's fears that damages will be assessed against it for fault stemming from the
employer's actions are groundless. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970). In De Arroyo v.
Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877
(1970), for example, damages were entirely charged to the company because the union's conduct
neither increased nor contributed to the damages arising from the improper discharges. Id. at
289-90.
90. 442 U.S. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
91. id. at 57-58.
92. Id. at 51 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 51-52. As Justice Blackmun commented:
The Court's theory seems to be that a union, fearing punitive damages, might be-
come more vigilant in processing workers' grievances; that this vigilance might lead
unions to process frivolous grievances; that this frivolity might antagonize the
employer; and that this antagonism might beget disharmony at the bargaining table.
This reasoning seems tenuous to me. Surely, the Court cannot believe that such
airy speculations will induce union shop stewards to abandon all vestiges of common
sense as they go about their diurnal chores.
Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. id. at 58.
95. Id. at 59-60. See Swedo, Ruzicka v. General Motors Corporation: Negligence, Exhaus-
tion of Remedies, and Relief in Duty of Fair Representation Cases, ABB. J., June, 1978, at 15.
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cause the bulk of such damages is usually assessed against the employer. 96
An employee therefore is left without recourse to a strong legal remedy in
the face of particularly outrageous misconduct by his or her union. 97 An
employee may obtain some relief in a proceeding before the NLRB, of
course, but the power of the Board to fashion remnedies is more limited than
that of the courts. 9 Further, the NLRB is primarily concerned with effec-
tuating broad federal labor law policies, and is less concerned with the
wrongs committed against an individual. 99 While the duty of fair represen-
tation was created to protect such individual interests, 100 its enforcement
96. See note 89 supra. The majority appeared to recognize that union immunity might re-
suit, but argued that the Vaca court found that the risk of depleting union treasuries out-
weighed considerations of deterrence. 442 U.S. at 50-51. The argument has also been advanced
that compensatory damages sufficiently deter union conduct that violates its members' rights.
Section 102 Punitive Damages, supra note 44, at 537, 537 n.58. Cf. Brandwen, Punitive-
Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 460, 465-66 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Brandwen] (compensatory damages have deterrent effect, but degree un-
certain). In Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961), the court
suggested that relief should be limited to compensatory damages and equitable remedies. Id. at
506.
97. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976):
Unless punitive damages are available, an employee may lack the strong legal rem-
edy necessary to protect his right against a union which has either maliciously or in
utter disregard of his rights denied him fair representation. The situation is analo-
gous to that present in civil rights actions where the plaintiff's rights are equally
important and often equally difficult to enforce without the threat to defendants of
liability for punitive damages in an aggravated case.
Id. at 563.
98. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961). The
NLRB's remedial actions are limited to cease and desist orders, reinstatement with full back pay
and seniority, requiring a union to process a grievance, ordering representation elections, or
revocation of a union's certification. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act §§ 9(c)(1), 9(e),
10(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1), 159(e), 160(c) (1976). See GORMAN, supra note 35, at 725-28.
Even if damages are appropriate, the NLRB is powerless to award them. Local 60, United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. at 653-56 (NLRB's remedial powers do not include
authority to require union to refund dues and fees to members); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940) (NLRB's affirmative powers do not authorize imposition of punitive
measures, such as requiring payments to government); NLRB v. United States Steel Corp., 278
F.2d 896, 900 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 908 (1961) (NLRB not authorized to impose
penalties or fines, such as reimbursement of dues). The courts are also preferred as a forum
because the NLRB adheres to a six-month statute of limitations for unfair labor practice cases.
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). In addition, an
employee runs the risk that his or her grievance will never be heard because the Board's
General Counsel has the discretion to decide whether to issue a complaint. Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 182 (1967); GORMAN, supra note 35, at 701.
99. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 182 n.8.
100. As the Vaca court observed, the duty of fair representation serves as "a bulwark to
prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by
the provisions of federal labor law." Id. at 182. See notes 11-30 and accompanying text supra.
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will lack impact in instances of egregious union misconduct if a punitive
sanction is unavailable.
In addition, an employee will lack the incentive to sue his or her union if
punitive damages are no longer an available remedy in fair representation
cases. Because an employee assumes serious risks by suing the more power-
ful union, providing such an incentive is an important function of punitive
awards. 101 Because an employee must trust the union to represent his or
her interests vigorously and fairly, 102 a severe sanction must be available
when a union violates its solemn responsibility. The Court in Foust, there-
fore, eliminated a necessary and desirable employee remedy by prohibiting
damages in the fair representation context.
Further, the possible imposition of a punitive award will no longer be
available in Railway Labor Act suits to deter unions from acting injuriously
toward employees. The majority, downplaying the deterrent effect of puni-
tive damages, argued that such damages are a form of punishment 10 3 and
are therefore inappropriate under remedial labor statutes. Punishment is one
purpose of punitive awards, 104 but deterrence is also an acknowledged ob-
jective. 105 Significantly, the propriety of deterrence as an objective in labor
Although the Foust majority acknowledged the importance of the personal compensation af-
forded individual employees through the vehicle of fair representation suits, its opinion favored
the "larger" interests of federal labor law policies at the expense of individual protection. 442
U.S. at 49 n.12. For example, see the Court's balancing of the collective interests of union
members in protecting union funds and union bargaining strength as against an individual's
interest in redress for injuries suffered at the hands of the union. Id. at 50-51.
101. Archibald Cox aptly described the plight of a resourceless union employee, faced with
the prospect of suing his or her union for a breach of the duty of fair representation:
Workers are unfamiliar with the law and hesitate to become involved in legal pro-
ceedings. The cost is likely to be heavy, and they have little money with which to
post bonds, pay lawyer's fees and print voluminous records. Time is always on the
side of the defendant. Even if the suit is successful, there are relatively few situa-
tions in which the plaintiff or his attorney can reap financial advantage. Most men
are reluctant to incur financial cost in order to vindicate intangible rights. Individual
workers who sue union officers run enormous risks, for there are many ways, legal
as well as illegal, by which entrenched officials can "take care of" recalcitrant mem-
bers.
Cox, supra note 37, at 853. The value of having punitive damages available in such instances
was echoed in Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive
Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158, 1162-63 (1966).
102. An employee's need to have the full backing of his or her union in processing a griev-
ance was dealt with at length in Schum v. South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974). The
court recognized that an employee lacks the knowledge, expertise, and experience in interpret-
ing the complicated provisions of a labor agreement and wants skill in preparing a well-
organized, persuasive grievance campaign. Id. at 331.
103. 442 U.S. at 50-51. See notes 42-43 supra.
104. See note 43 supra.
105. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 204-05; PROSSER, supra note 43, at 9; Brandwen, supra note
96, at 465.
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cases has received judicial support. 106 As a deterrent, punitive damages are
an especially effective device for correcting persistent patterns of union mis-
conduct, 107 Furthermore, such awards serve to deter repetition of the pro-
hibited behavior in the future. 108 While a punitive sanction should be
utilized sparingly, 109 it should remain available to deter and correct in-
stances of union misconduct that cannot be better cured by other remedies.
For example, conduct calculated to thwart national labor policies, such as
discrimination based on race or non-union status, 110 would be a particularly
appropriate target for a punitive sanction. 111 Because punitive damages no
106. Vaca v. Sipes 386 U.S. at 187; Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48,
529 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976) (deterrence a proper objective in case of retaliation against
union oficial for intraunion political activity); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell,
388 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) (deterrence a proper objective in
case of employee's expulsion fr'om union). The propriety of deterrence as al objective in labor
suits was also generally acknowledged in Emmanuel v. Onmaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560
F.2d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1977), and in Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d
442, 454, 454 n.20 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
In Foust, the trial court instructed the jury that punitive damages could be awarded to punish
extraordinary misconduct that was malicious, wanton, or oppressive. Brief for Respondent at
16-17. Deterrence was also mentioned as a basis for a punitive award. Id.
107. As the court noted in Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 249 F.
Supp. 664 (N.D. II. 1966): "[Wlhere the award is a uniquely effective device for changing a
specific pattern of illegal conduct by a party before the court, it comes within the remedial
purpose of the labor laws, even though the defendant may suffer as if he had been 'punished'
for other reasons." Id. at 671. See Butler v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nora. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1974).
108. The trial court in Butler v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., approved of the deterrent effect:
"[TIhe award of punitive damages in this case is calculated to deter persistent misconduct and
thereby to secure industrial peace presently and in the future." 374 F. Supp. at 754. See Sands
v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
109. The remedy fashioned by a court should be carefully tailored to meet a specific prob-
lem. Punitive damages, as an extraordinary form of relief, will therefore be appropriate in only
certain instances. Butler v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 374 F. Supp. at 753-54. The Wanzer
court similarly commented: "Federal labor laws are strictly 'remedial' in the sense that they are
to be applied only to redress particular acts of misconduct. . . . [T]he labor laws do not con-
template awards which do not cure a specific problem." 249 F. Supp. at 670 (citations omitted).
The Wanzer court's approach was cited with approval by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973).
110. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316
F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963): "A union has no more justification to discriminate injuriously in its
representation on the ground of non-membership, or instability of membership, . . . than it has
to discriminate on account of skin pigmentation." Id. at 199.
An employer's practices in violation of labor policies were suggested as appropriate targets for
punitive damages in Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F. 2d 277,
280-83 (3d Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (Staley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
theoretical basis of the judge's argument is persuasive, although an award of punitive damages
probably was unjustified on the facts of the case, as the plant had already closed and such an
award would not have promoted the goal of industrial peace. See College Hall Fashions, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Joint Bd., Clothing Workers, 408 F. Supp. 722, 727 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (punitive
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longer pose a threat, however, a union will not be deterred from pursuing
such a course of injurious conduct. Compensatory damages are an insuffi-
cient alternative as a deterrent because they infrequently have a burden-
some effect on a union. 112 Therefore, in the absence of a punitive threat, a
union essentially will be free to conduct its affairs without regard for civil
consequences.
In addition, a contrary holding in Foust would not have had the serious
impact upon union financial stability predicted by the Court. Adequate
safeguards exist to protect against excessive and undeserved punitive
awards. 113 For example, an appellate court has the power to remand a case
to the trial court for reconsideration of the awarded amount. 114 Because the
trend is toward high punitive awards, it has been suggested that both trial
and appellate courts subject punitive awards to much closer scrutiny than is
usually accorded compensatory damage awards. l15 Trial courts could also
sanctions against employer would not have directly advanced the goal of industrial peace as
plant operations had ceased and employees were no longer working for the company).
111. Justice Blackmun suggested that deliberate personal animus, the conscious infringement
of speech or associational freedoms, or intentional racial discrimination would be instances of
union misconduct justifying a punitive award. 442 U.S. at 60 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
need for an effective sanction in cases of flagrant union misconduct was underscored by the
court in Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 App. Div. 2d 331, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 792 (1963):
The right of the working man to the benefits of collective bargaining is too essential
and valuable to be hindered, impeded and seriously damaged by irresponsible and
dictatorial leaders whose dominance in any given situation does great disservice to
the purpose and principles of unionism. When that right of free association is
usurped by a concerted, malicious effort to deprive the individual of the safeguards
built into the association, it cannot be condoned .... Imposition of exemplary dam-
ages, when the requisite elements of malice, gross fraud, wanton or wicked con-
duct, violence or oppression are present, serves to achieve the deterrence they
were designed to effect.
Id. at 334-35, 239 N.Y.S. 2d at 796.
112. See notes 89 and 96 supra for differing views as to the sufficiency of compensatory
damages as deterrents.
113. But see Section 102 Punitive Damages, supra note 44, at 539-40, where the argument is
advanced that union resources would be wasted and that some unions might be crippled finan-
cially by punitive damage awards. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), where the dissent-
ing justice, referring to union liability for unfair labor practices committed by its members,
warned against the "very real prospect of staggering punitive damages. Id. at 652 (War-
ren, C.J., dissenting).
114. This was done by the Tenth Circuit in Foust because the court thought the punitive
damage award was high, although not excessive. 572 F.2d at 719. As the Tenth Circuit noted,
the trial court, having heard the evidence, is best suited to review the awarded amount. Id.
The trial court may order a remittitur if upon reconsideration it concludes that the amount
awarded was indeed excessive. Id. A new trial may also be granted. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
464 F.2d 26, 47 (5th Cir. 1972); Prochot v. Drew, 283 F.2d 904, 905 (7th Cir. 1960).
115. This point was made in dicta in Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 34
(2d Cir. 1976). One commentator proposes that observance of discretionary limitations on
amounts of punitive damage awards could minimize the effect upon union coffers. Section 102
Punitive Damages, supra note 44, at 540. Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 n.13 (1973) (Court
suggested that limitations on the size of attorney's fees awards could avoid financial difficulty).
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frame their instructions to the jury in order to emphasize that punitive dam-
ages are proper only in limited instances and that a particular defendant's
likelihood of repeating the alleged misconduct should be used as a test for
punitive awards. 116 Procedural safeguards, such as proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt and the right to invoke the fifth amendment, could perhaps be
utilized. 117 Punitive damage awards are, of course, subject to abuse by
capricious or prejudiced juries. 118 Although some poorly instructed juries
might make inflated awards, 119 a properly instructed jury should be able to
arrive at a sensible and fair result, assessing punitive damages against a
union where its misconduct merits a more severe and memorable sanction
than compensatory damages alone. 120
Similarly, a drastic reduction in union discretionary power would not
necessarily result if punitive damages remained an available remedy in fair
representation suits. Union discretion is an undoubtedly essential element in
employer-employee-union relations, 121 but union authority is not an abso-
lute power. 122 The fiduciary duty of fair representation is an obligation cor-
116. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d at 34-35. The trial court's instructions
to the jury in Foust illustrate the type of well-phrased, careful admonishment that should con-
tribute to reasonable punitive awards:
[Tihe jury should also bear in mind, not only the conditions under which, and the
purpose for which, the law permits an award of punitive and exemplary damages to
be made, but also the requirement of the law that the amount of such extraordinary
damages, when awarded, must be fixed with calm discretion and sound reason, and
must never be either awarded, or fixed in amount, because of any sympathy, or
bias, or prejudice with respect to any part of the case.
Brief for Respondent at 17-18. But see Brandwen, supra note 96, at 468: "It is urged that a
judge can, by his charge to the jury, effectively check a jury's prejudices or abuses. That is
expecting too much. The charge generally tends to be an arid abstract proposition of law. Its
objectivity-however profuse-rarely illuminates or guides juries." In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court warned that the "gentle rule" that punitive damages not be
excessive was inadequate to prevent juries from awarding "punitive damages in wholly unpre-
dictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused." Id. at 350.
117. Section 102 Punitive Damages, supra note 44, at 541.
118. 442 U.S. at 50-51, 50 n.14. As the Court observed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 350, some juries may use punitive damages as a means of punishing an unpopular
defendant.
119. See Brandwen, supra note 96, at 466-67, where the author contends that a jury's hostil-
ity or even sympathy toward the defendant, as well as local prejudice, can lead to haphazard
punitive damage awards. As the author argues, "[a] defendant can become a helpless prey and a
sport of prejudice." Id. at 481. Even if clear instructions are given by the court, "[t]he
principle-sufficient to deter but not to oppress-is too shadowy a measure to effect a rational
determination of punitive-exemplary damages." Id. at 466.
120. In tort actions, the defendant's wealth may be considered in determining the size of a
punitive damage award. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 210. So that the sanction against a union will
be effective in deterring future misconduct, the size of a union's treasury should similarly be
considered before fixing the amount of the punitive award.
121. See Fanning, supra note 22, at 813-14, 817.
122. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944).
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relative to the right of a union to represent the bargaining unit. 123 The
discretion exercised by a union is therefore necessarily subject to the tests of
good faith and honesty of purpose1 2 4 in order to protect against arbitrary
abuses of power. In addition, Vaca afforded a crucial protection for union
discretion in instances where a union's representation is questioned. In
Vaca, the Court declared that even a claim later shown to be meritorious
would not necessarily prove a union's breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion. 125 This is a significant safeguard apparently overlooked by the major-
ity in Foust. It guarantees that a union retains the discretionary power to
determine that a particular grievance is hopeless or without merit, so long as
arbitrariness and bad faith play no part in the union's decision. 126
Furthermore, the majority's contention that the threat of punitive dam-
ages might compel unions to process frivolous grievances, thereby undermin-
ing the union's collective bargaining position, is an unwarranted conjec-
ture. 12 7  The sensible dictates of Vaca clearly allow a union to exercise
discretion in separating frivolous claims from justified grievances. 1 2 8  A
union would not be subjected to vexatious litigation over every arguable
decision because the threshold standard for a breach of the fair representa-
123. Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1970).
124. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338. Three circuits have agreed in theory that
unions are afforded a reasonable range of discretion so long as their conduct remains non-
arbitrary and non-discriminatory: Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir.
1976); Bond v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975); Trotter v.
Motor Coach Employees, 309 F.2d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
As the Court noted in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), so long as a union acts upon
"wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors," it will not be held
liable for a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 350. Even a good faith position
contrary to that of some individuals the union represents will not constitute a breach. Id. at
349. The complete satisfaction of all members in the unit is not expected. Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338. See note 2 supra.
125. 386 U.S. at 195. Accord, Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 648 (10th
Cir. 1973); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
126. See Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1971)
(union has authority to abandon a grievance it considers meritless); Bazarte v. United Transp.
Union, 429 F.2d at 872 (union has right to consider grievance hopeless).
127. According to one commentator, frivolous grievances are of little advantage to the
employees bringing them:
[E]mployees do not regard it in their own interest to press forward grievances that
are without merit. . . . [T]here is even less likelihood that employees will abuse the
grievance machinery at its advanced stages, since the costs which they personally
will bear in pursuing their individual grievances will increase while potential ben-
efits remain unchanged.
Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559, 566
(1968) (hereinafter cited as Control Over Personal Grievances].
128. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190-95. A union's power to sift out "wholly frivolous
grievances which would only clog the grievance process" has been acknowledged by the courts.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. at 349-50. Accord, Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines,
Inc., 437 F.2d at 171; Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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tion duty requires a high degree of union culpability. 129 In any event, if a
union and employer make a good faith effort to settle grievances, even mar-
ginally frivolous claims would be concluded prior to the more time-
consuming and costly steps in the grievance procedure.130 In addition, it is
doubtful that unions would be blackmailed by undeserving plaintiffs. 131 A
properly functioning judicial system or grievance procedure ensures that
harassing, meritless suits will be disposed of summarily. To expect any less
betrays an unwarranted mistrust and lack of confidence in both systems. 132
CONCLUSION
Although the Foust holding is restricted to Railway Labor Act suits, its
prohibition of punitive damages in the context of fair representation suits
could be an indication that the Court will attempt to extend the reach of its
ruling to other labor statutes. 133 Specific statutory language regarding rem-
edies may present an obstacle, but none of the remedial provisions in re-
129. By requiring that bad faith, hostile discrimination, or arbitrariness be shown, a union
will be insulated from a barrage of harrassing litigation by dissident or disgruntled members.
See Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1972).
130. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191. An interesting proposition regarding the processing of
grievances was advanced in Control Over Personal Grievances, supra note 127. Frivolous claims
would be discouraged and union responsibility encouraged, according to the author's plan, if an
arbitrator were empowered to assign the costs of the proceeding:
If the individual employee chose to process his claim without the assistance of the
union, or to pursue it after the union withdrew, he could be required to bear his
proportionate share of the costs. In fact, if his claim is frivolous, he could be as-
signed all or part of his employer's costs as well. As an offset, unions which have
declined to press the employee's grievances could be required to pay his costs
should he succeed.
• . . If the grievance brought by an employee is indeed frivolous, then it will fail
in arbitration, and the union will escape untaxed. Moreover, the union's credibility
will be enhanced-not impaired-where it demonstrates the worth of its judgment
by refusing to process a grievance subsequently determined to be frivolous.
Id. at 567.
131. Brief for Respondent at 14.
132. The judicial system, after all, protects unions as well as employees. Id. But see Section
102 Punitive Damages, supra note 44, at 539. The author contends that punitive damages
will encourage suits based on private feuding, forcing courts to wage intraunion battles. Accord-
ing to the author, ordinary union activities will be hampered and union resources wasted by
frivolous claims. In addition, inviting additional suits will place an unwarranted burden on al-
ready overburdened courts. Id.
133. The majority in Foust specifically excluded the reach of its holding from claims brought
under §§ 101-102 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 411-412 (1976), because such suits involve the interpretation of express statutory
language. 442 U.S. at 47 n.9. However, because some judicial disagreement exists at the
district and circuit court levels as to the propriety of punitive damages in Landrum-Griffin suits,
see note 36 supra, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court might choose to extend its per se
prohibition to Landrum-Griffin suits.
Further, the principles articulated in Foust regarding the impropriety of punitive damages in
fair representation suits might well be adopted in suits brought under the Taft-Hartley Act. The
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lated labor statutes expressly authorizes punitive damages. 134 Therefore, it
is not inconceivable that a court determined to eliminate punitive damages
will discover a way to justify their exclusion. The Foust holding is evidence
of such judicial willpower because the Court's per se prohibition of punitive
awards was manifestly unnecessary on the facts of the case.
Because union immunity from liability for serious violations of its mem-
bers' rights has effectively received the approval of the Supreme Court in
Foust, some measure of protection must be afforded employees. The Railway
Labor Act therefore should be amended to include a provision for punitive
damages in specifically restricted instances of notorious union misbehavior.
Accordingly, the burden is now on Congress to provide a suitable civil rem-
edy for employees injured by their union's flagrant breach of the duty of
fair representation. As the complete lack of congressional directives in the
Railway Labor Act permitted the Court in Foust to fashion its own labor
policy, an expressly worded provision for specific remedies in the Railway
Labor Act would resolve the uncertainty regarding proper remedial mea-
sures. Such an amendment to the Act would also serve to warn the Court
that the balancing of policy considerations, which is the province of Con-
gress, should not necessarily result in a tilt in favor of unions.
Mary Currie
interrelationship of the Railway Labor Act and the Taft-Hartley Act is undisputed. In deciding
cases under § 301 of Taft-Hartley, the Supreme Court has looked for guidance to principles
established by cases under the Railway Labor Act. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The Court similarly has utilized its decisions under § 301 to decide
cases under Railway Labor Act. Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972); Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
134. See note 36 supra.
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